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How Not to Read the Hebrew Bible 
Jay A. Holstein 
Not the assertion that J was a woman but the manner in which Bloom 
interprets J's Yahweh is what is truly provocative about The Book ofj. As 
Bloom sees it, J's Yahweh is: "impish," "outrageous," "irascible," "a lively 
fellow," "childlike," "a bungler," "overwhelmingly self-contradictory," 
"a mischief-maker," "an intensely nervous leader," and "outrageously 
volatile." By the time Bloom sums up his presentation by observing that 
J's Yahweh encompasses Lear, Hamlet, Prospero, and "even a Falstaff," 
the reader understands that this is no hyperbole designed to draw our 
attention to what follows. This is "what follows." Instead of Yahweh, 
David is J's hero because his life-giving, life-enhancing vitality lifts him 
above such distinctions as the good and the bad. Bloom is aware, of 
course, that David the great warrior king is also depicted not only as a 
freebooter but as a liar, adulterer, and murderer. What Bloom believes J 
finds so attractive about David is not his moral fiber but his exuberant 
vitality. And it is in line with this vital life force that J, according to 
Bloom, frames her character sketch of Deity, a sketch that has been persis 
tently misread. David, whom J never explicitly mentions but who is 
always suspended above her narratives, is what J's Yahweh is striving to 
be. "J's Yahweh is not endowed with such rabbinical attributes as holi 
ness, purity, goodness. . . . His leading attribute is zeal or zest, so that the 
zestful David is clearly the most theomorphic of humans." 
No doubt then that Bloom's thesis is vivid. No doubt either that Bloom 
is convinced he is onto something that traditional exegetes have missed, 
blinded as they are by the normative readings of sacred writ and to some 
thing, moreover, that Higher Critics have also missed because they lack 
Bloom's feel for J's genius and boldness. I am sympathetic to the way in 
which Bloom compares the biblical author he calls J to other great writers 
of fiction. And I certainly applaud his insistence that "a difficult text" 
must be understood through "a sympathetic and imaginative reading." 
Bloom's reading is "imaginative" enough. But is it "sympathetic" ? 
What I would take to be a sympathetic reading would entail the assump 
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tions that we share a common universe of discourse with the work and 
that the work as it presents itself is intelligible on its own terms. While 
Bloom certainly assumes a common universe of discourse with J, he fails 
on two counts to give that writer a sympathetic reading. In the first place, 
he virtually ignores the context in which this supposed source appears. 
And second, since he assumes that this source has been censored, revised, 
even mutilated, his presentation is filled with hypotheticals. Bloom claims 
to have a "feel" for J. He claims not only to be able to recognize J but to be 
able to notice the ways in which the Redactor both embellished the J 
source and excised from it. "One recognizes J not by the use of the name 
Yahweh rather than Elohim, but by vision and word play, by irony and 
humor, by the shock of an originality that cannot be staled by cultural 
repetitions." Thus while Bloom, for the most part, follows what most 
biblical scholars take to be J, he does not hesitate to part company with 
them. Bloom pays particular attention to Gen. 22, the enigmatic story in 
which Elohim commands Abraham to burn his son to a crisp, and con 
cludes that originally this was J's tale and therefore that it was Yahweh 
and not Elohim who gave the command. Bloom is certain that this tale 
resonates with J's spirit and rewrites the manner in which Abraham and 
Sarah die in accord with that spirit. Bloom repeats this procedure through 
out his commentary. He rewrites portions of the Noah and Joseph stories 
and does the same with the story of Moses. 
Bloom's treatment of the Garden of Eden story is a parade example of 
his ignoring chief aspects of context and coasting on speculations that suit 
his "feel," by which process he casts aside central elements of the story 
? 
the Tree of Life, for example ?that should bear upon our interpretation of 
the whole. In so doing, he ignores as well the rich implications of the first 
human presence divided, unlike Yahweh, into male and female. 
Bloom prefaces his commentary with the following quotation from 
Kafka, who, he claims, "caught the essence of J's sense of Paradise": 
The expulsion from Paradise is in its main significance eternal. 
Consequently the expulsion from Paradise is final, and life in 
this world irrevocable, but the eternal nature of the occurrence 
(or temporally expressed, the eternal recapitulation of the 
occurrence) makes it nevertheless possible that not only could 
we live continuously in Paradise, but that we are continuously 
there in actual fact, no matter whether we know it here or not. 
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" 
'Paradise,' Bloom goes on to say, "is always 'there,' and our knowing 
is 'here,' but our being is split off from our knowing, and so it is possible 
that we still abide in Eden." Bloom tells us that the key to the Eden story 
is a determination of the significance of those two trees located in the middle 
of the garden: the Tree of the Knowledge of the Good and the Bad and the 
Tree of Life. Bloom remarks that 
"many thousands of exegetes" who have 
read "J's ironic narrative as a story of sin or crime and its appropriate (or 
incommensurate) punishments" have misinterpreted the function of these 
two trees. 
Pragmatically they are [one], since only the Tree of knowing 
good and bad is involved in the catastrophe, and also is J's own 
invention. The Tree of Life is prevalent in the literature of the 
ancient Middle East, and I suspect that J interpolated this tradi 
tional tree into her text as an interpretive afterthought. Know 
ing good and bad seems quite enough; to touch the tree is to be 
touched the same day, by death. (178) 
But what, in addition to being "touched" by death, does the fruit of this 
tree impart? Not, Bloom claims, consciousness of sexuality, because J has 
"too healthy a view of human sexuality for such a reduction to be relevant 
or interesting." The knowledge of good and bad, according to Bloom, is 
"no less than everything, freedom and the limits of freedom, self 
knowledge, angelic, almost god-like. . . . When you know yourself, you 
know your own nakedness, but the consequent shame has no sexual over 
tones." 
Rather than leaning so much on a supposed insight of Kafka, Bloom 
might have given more consideration to that "interpretive afterthought," 
the Tree of Life, which is indeed "prevalent in the literature of the ancient 
Middle East." In the Epic ofGilgamesh, a plant called "Man becomes young 
in old age" is given prominence. That plant has been interpreted not as a 
one time elixir of life but as a tonic of rejuvenation. A serpent also appears 
in that tale, robbing Gilgamesh of the great prize which the hero had 
intended to share with others. In Gilgamesh, also, the transformation of 
the savage, Enkidu, is telling, for he is, as it were, civilized by the act of 
sexual intercourse. Moreover, Enkidu is told, "You are wise, Enkidu, and 
now you have become like a god."1 The writer whom Bloom calls J uses 
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these very words to refer to the transformation of her characters. Bloom's 
highly literate J surely would have had access to a piece of literature which 
goes back to the originators of civilization in Mesopotamia and which has 
been found in a variety of recensions and translations. Bloom might have 
paid more attention to the context suggested by these and other allusions 
in the Eden story to Gilgamesh. Then he might have given pause before 
concluding that the Tree of the Knowledge of the Good and the Bad is 
unrelated to sexual awareness or that the Tree of Life is inessential to the 
story. 
Since Bloom makes so much of both the woman's and the snake's parts 
in the Eden story it is surprising that he does so little with the breath 
taking conversation between them. To compound the problem, Rosen 
berg's translation is an impediment rather than a help. Rosenberg's very 
brief notes on his translation (325-335) contain no hint of the extent to 
which he plays fast and loose with the Hebrew. Rosenberg, for example, 
in the Eden story renders elohim as "The God" where the Hebrew is with 
out the definite article. There are examples aplenty in Scripture when the 
definite article is applied to elohim, but this is not one of them. In fact, 
neither Bloom nor Rosenberg comments on what is surely a significant lit 
erary curiosity, that both the woman and the snake use elohim in their con 
versation while the narrator uses the anomalous phrase "YHWH-elohim" 
to refer to Deity. Rosenberg, for reasons never explained, drops the elohim 
from the phrase. 
Furthermore, this conversation turns on two hyperboles which Rosen 
berg's translation effectively conceals from the reader. The serpent, whom 
the author introduces by punning on his chief characteristic?the serpent 
is the most arum or 
"cunning" of all beasts and it will be the serpent who 
will initiate a process whereby the first human couple will become aware 
that they are arum or "naked" ?asks "Did elohim really say that you could 
not eat of the fruit of any of the trees of the garden? 
" 
One might suspect 
the serpent of irony. If so, his irony takes the form of a deliberate exag 
geration: is it true that there is no sustenance in Eden? or, better, is there 
nothing which gives life in Eden? 
The woman, for her part, responds with hyperbole of her own, "We 
can eat from the fruit of the trees of the garden except for that tree which 
is in the middle of the garden for elohim said that we must neither eat from 
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it nor touch it lest we die." YHWH-elohim in his command or warning 
did not add the word "touch." Nor did YHWH-elohim say anything 
about that other tree in the middle of the garden, the Tree of Life. Bloom 
ignores the issue altogether, presumably because he is certain that for J the 
Tree of Life is merely "an interpretive afterthought." Is it not a reasonable 
hypothesis that YHWH-elohim said nothing about the Tree of Life 
because only the Tree of the Knowledge of the Good and the Bad is rele 
vant in the command or warning? In Eden, Adam and Eve were not 
denied access to the Tree of Life, and this is why dying and death were not 
a part of human existence there. The Tree of Life would be comparable to 
the plant that makes one young again in Gilgamesh. Gilgamesh, though he 
already has eaten of the plant, is reduced to despair when it is taken away 
by the serpent. 
Eve's own hyperbole suggests that in Eden life is nourishing except for 
one death-dealing tree which must be avoided at all costs. Not only must 
we avoid eating its fruit, but we must avoid touching it. The snake's 
response, which is corroborated by none other than YHWH-elohim (cf. 
3:5 with 3:22), is that elohim Himself knows that far from being a death 
dealer the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of the Good and the Bad 
makes one like elohim, Who knows the good and the bad. The serpent's 
position is that the choice facing the first human couple is clear: a living 
death in Eden where there is nothing of substance to do and therefore no 
chance to matter, or to seize the possibility of creative activity, activity 
which is imitative of the creator, elohim. 
Rosenberg's translation does not accurately convey what it is the 
woman sees when she looks at the Tree of Knowledge after considering 
the snake's retort. Here is how Rosenberg renders the Hebrew: "Now the 
woman sees how good the tree looks to eat from, how lovely to the eyes, 
lively to the mind." And here is what the Hebrew says: "Then the woman 
saw that the tree was good for eating and that it was a delight to the eyes 
and desirable as a tree to make one wise." Rosenberg obscures the force of 
the words which I translated 
"delight" and "desirable," words that in the 
Hebrew frequently denote the delights of the body and of the soul, the 
very things which are absent in Eden.2 
Adam and Eve took from the Tree of Knowledge for good reason: the 
fruit of that tree made them like elohim. But unlike elohim, whose divinity 
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includes life forever as well, the humans will be subject to death and 
dying. The fruit of the Tree of Knowledge activated humankind's sexual 
ity which will lead to procreation (the first story outside of Eden begins: 
"Now Adam knew his wife Eve, and she conceived and gave birth to 
Cain"), which will not only function now as the antidote to the death of 
the human species but which, for obvious reasons, cannot coexist with 
deathlessness. There is nothing "mystical" about the Tree of Life; inside 
Eden it was the antidote to death when the human community consisted 
of one woman and one man. The first human couple must be evicted from 
the Garden because their newly acquired creativity, of which procreation 
is a part, necessarily entails finitude. 
Bloom's comment on 3:22 that YHWH-elohim (Rosenberg, of course, 
leaves out elohim) is speaking to "godlike beings" when He observes that 
the humans have become "like one of us" requires additional attention. 
The term elohim, when it refers to the God of Israel, denotes a singular 
being. However, the im ending is the normal sign of masculine plurality 
and, in fact, elohim is an amphibolous term in that it can refer to the shades 
in Sheol (the abode of the dead), powerful human rulers, to the gods of 
other nations, and so on. However, there are three instances in Genesis in 
which plurality is connected with the singular God of biblical Israel. Two 
of these occurrences (one in Eden, the other in the Babel story) are in what 
Bloom and Rosenberg refer to as the J source. In each instance Bloom and 
Rosenberg maintain that the plurality points to a conversation between 
"Yahweh" and other divine beings.3 
Bloom's comment on the Tower of Babel story is particularly instruc 
tive: 
Speaking presumably to the other Elohim, his angels, or per 
haps even to himself, Yahweh decides to descend, to make one 
of his familiar terrestrial inspections, and once there makes mis 
chief, baffling language into languages, confusion, ruin, scat 
tering. We have been given J's largest insight into the psychol 
ogy of Yahweh: he sets limits, boundaries, contexts, for his 
creatures, and he does not allow presumptuous violations of 
limits, whether by Adam and Eve, Cain, the builders of Babel, 
or even the Patriarchs and Moses, let alone Pharoah and the 
Egyptians. (294) 
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This, I think, is an instance in which Bloom's conviction that J's Yah 
weh is uncanny, irascible, impish, etc. causes him to miss a nuance in the 
text which, in fact, is crucial in revealing aspects of Deity's psychology. 
Neither Bloom nor Rosenberg asks why in precisely these two contexts 
(Gen. 3:22; 11:7) plurality appears in reference to the one God of biblical 
Israel. And since both of them restrict themselves to the so-called J docu 
ment, they do not speculate on what the plurality may mean in Gen. 1:26 
which reads: "And elohim said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our 
likeness.'" Gen. 1:26 is particularly interesting because after the "us" both 
"image" and "likeness" are singular. 
If one looks at these three instances of plurality (one involving elohim, 
one YHWH-elohim, one YHWH) one sees that in each there is an explicit 
comparison and an implied contrast between the divine and human 
realms. The first concerns the creation of the humans. The second deals 
with their expulsion from Eden, while the third occurs in the Tower of 
Babel story in which YHWH intervenes to stop the ascent of the sky 
scraping tower. 
The first of those passages emphasizes the uniqueness of the human, the 
only being created in Deity's likeness. But its context also points to a basic 
contrast between elohim and the human; for while humans are created 
"male and female" (the only creature in Gen. 1 in which this sexual dis 
tinction is explicitly noted), the implication is that elohim is not defined or 
limited by sexual distinctions.4 Only because of Adam and Eve (alone 
created in the likeness of elohim) could one think that a similar distinction 
exists in elohim. Thus the writer might have introduced the unexpected 
plural form ironically: it alerts the reader to the fact that this most basic of 
all human divisions is absent in Deity, or to put it another way, that Deity 
comprehends all division. 
The issue of maleness and femaleness is, no matter how one interprets 
it, at the heart of the Garden of Eden story. In the resolution of this story 
it is clear that both YHWH-elohim and Adam and Eve possess the creative 
capacity associated with the Tree of the Knowledge of the Good and the 
Bad whereas only YHWH-elohim has the Tree of Life. Once again, the 
plurality points toward a comparison and contrast between the divine and 
human realms. While only Adam and Eve have the godlike capacity to 
create their destiny, they, unlike Deity, are subject to dying and death. 
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In the story of the Tower of Babel, Deity's inherent singularity is con 
trasted similarly to the disunity in the human community. At Babel, 
YHWH fragments the human community, but we are given to under 
stand that these divisions do not suggest any division in YHWH. We are 
also to understand that although there are divisions in humankind they 
are, as it were, conventional and not natural. All human beings are still 
presumed to be created in elohim\ own image and to have access to the 
fundamental norms (the "good" and the "bad"). Perhaps this explains 
why there are celebrated examples of noble pagans in the Hebrew Bible 
(Tamar, Ruth, Uriah the Hittite). 
Comparison of these passages in their varying contexts allows us to give 
the following characteristics of the biblical God: "He" is asexual, creative, 
eternally vital, and by nature indivisible. And, as one biblical story after 
another makes explicit, this Deity has an interest in humankind. But of 
what does this interest consist and what does this Deity expect of human 
creatures? Bloom's answer is that to the extent Yahweh is not uncanny he 
is irascible and impish. Again and again, Bloom's uncritical acceptance of 
the Higher Critical dogma that the Torah can and should be divided into 
sources not 
only involves him in conjectures which do not clarify the text, 
but leads him to reductive readings that separate an episode from the very 
contexts without which it cannot be understood. Thus when Bloom reads 
the story of the first brothers (Gen. 4), he insists that Cain's "crucial qual 
ity is not evil but an implied resentment against Yahweh. He, after all, and 
not Abel, the shepherd, takes up Adam's curse and tills the soil. . . . J 
offers no motive for Yahweh's choice." 
Reflect for a moment, however, on the manner in which the story of 
the first brothers proceeds. Cain and Abel bring offerings to YHWH. 
Cain, the farmer, brings from the "fruit of the earth." Abel, the shepherd, 
and here let us listen to Rosenberg's translation which at this point is quite 
true to the sense of the Hebrew, "brought an offering, from the choicest 
of his flock, from its fat parts." That is, Cain simply brings an offering 
while Abel brings the best of his best. Bloom is quite wrong that "J offers 
no motive for Yahweh's choice." YHWH prefers Abel's offering because 
it speaks of real devotion. When Cain reacts in anger and jealousy, 
YHWH 
unambiguously indicates a way out of his discomfiture: "If you 
do right, there is uplift [you will feel better]; but if you do not do right, 
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sin is the demon at the door, whose urge is toward you, yet you can be its 
master." Cain, however, utterly rejects this revelation, murders his 
brother in cold blood, and displays no remorse?"Am I my brother's 
keeper? 
" 
he asks, when confronted by YHWH. If Cain is not depicted as 
"evil" then what is he? 
Bloom's treatment of Tamar, who, according to him "in proportion to 
the narrative space she occupies, is very much the most vivid portrait in J," 
fails also to come to grips with the only context in which she appears 
(Gen. 38) and fails completely to place this episode in its broader frame 
work. Bloom asserts that Tamar's outstanding characteristic is her vitality 
and that "the elliptical J gives us no psychological or spiritual portrait of 
Tamar, no account of her motive or of her will." For Bloom, Tamar's 
story is yet another indication that "the quality of being blessed has clearly 
more to do with the wholeness of being than with right judgment or 
moral behavior." 
While an exposition of Tamar's story is beyond the scope of this paper, 
I urge the interested reader to consult Herbert Cha?an Brichto's "Kin, 
Cult, Land and Afterlife: A Biblical Complex,"5 which reveals the ways in 
which the obligations of the living to the dead lie at the heart of this and 
many other biblical stories. In the light of these obligations, it is precisely 
Tamar's 
"right judgment" and "moral behavior" which are esteemed. 
Bloom's own treatment of Tamar corresponds to what he does through 
out his book. He praises J's literary genius in creating the "vivid" Tamar, 
but he devotes little more than a page to her story. 
Bloom's commentary depends not on a carefully considered textual 
reading but on hypotheses for which, by their very nature, there is no evi 
dence. Was J a woman? Did she live in the days of Solomon and Reho 
boam, and was her outlook conditioned by those times? What, in any 
case, do we know of Solomon's and Rehoboam's reigns? Did the Redac 
tor 
change J, and if so where and how and why? These questions are or 
should be secondary to the first order of business of a literary critic, a con 
frontation with a text as it presents itself.6 
Bloom's praise of J is often at the expense not only of other biblical 
writers but also of post-biblical interpreters who, according to him, lacked 
J's vision. Bloom particularly sets his sights on the great Rabbi Akiba. 
Bloom places Akiba in what he calls the "normative" tradition while his J 
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Stands with Kafka and Shakespeare. In the vast literature devoted to the 
explication of the Hebrew Bible there is, to be sure, much which would fit 
Bloom's view as to that which is normative. I gather this would include a 
belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God. For Bloom, 
normative readers have consistently and persistently misread J. He asso 
ciates the normative with a veneration which is both blinding and naive. 
But Bloom himself neither shows sufficient veneration for the biblical text 
(I mean nothing pietistic here; rather, I refer to Bloom's shoddy exegesis 
of what he himself calls a great text) nor does he give enough credit to 
Rabbi Akiba. 
In 
regard to the latter, consider the following story preserved in the 
sacred literature of the Jews (Babylonian Talmud Menahot 29b): 
When Moses climbed Mt. Sinai he found God sitting there and 
fashioning little hooks and crowns for the letters. Moses asked: 
"Lord of the World, for whose sake are You doing that? 
" 
God 
replied: "There is a man who will one day present heaps and 
heaps of doctrines concerning every little hook." Then Moses 
said to God: "Lord of the World, show him to me." God 
replied: "Turn around." Then Moses turned around and sat 
down behind the eighth row in Akiba's academy but Moses did 
not understand their conversation and was dismayed. When 
Akiba came to a point about which his students asked him how 
he knew, he replied to them that this was a doctrine given to 
Moses by God on Mt. Sinai. Then was Moses calmed. Moses 
turned back and stepped before God and said further: "Lord of 
the World you have such a man and give the Torah through 
me!" God replied: "Be still, that is how it entered My mind." 
Then Moses said to God: "Lord of the World, you have shown 
me his knowledge of the Law, show me his reward too." God 
said: "Turn around." Then Moses turned around and saw 
Akiba's flayed flesh [Akiba was executed by the Romans] being 
weighed in a butchershop. Then Moses said to God: "Lord of 
the World, this is the Torah, and this its reward?" God 
replied: "Be still, that is how it entered My Mind." 
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The elliptical density of this tale generates speculations about issues 
ranging from the quest for wisdom to the psychology of God. There is 
also the pathos of the interlinked destinies of Moses and Akiba, who both 
die in the service of God with vigor and vitality intact. More to the point 
is the interpretive paradigm championed by the tale. This Talmudic story 
begins with a hyperbole that is itself hyperbolized. Not only is God 
depicted as being the literal "author" of the Torah, He is portrayed taking 
such care in His work that a critic wishing to fathom authorial intent 
would have to scrutinize not only context, paragraph, sentence, word, 
and letter, but even each letter's calligraphy. It bears mentioning here that 
Akiba, whose interpretive capacities are legendary, never, of course, 
examined all the "hooks and crowns." 
Bloom's overstatements; conversely, bespeak of the hubris of an inter 
preter who makes a text conform to poorly thought through theoretical 
constructs. I would suggest that when one confronts the Hebrew Bible, 
the most elementary rules of exegesis demand the initial assumption that 
those who produced the biblical record had good reason for presenting it 
in the manner in which they did. They may have drawn from sources, but 
they did not divide their text into sources; they did not provide very much 
in the way of socio-economic data about their time; and they did not iden 
tify themselves. Any exegesis, therefore, which indulges in speculations 
about such matters in the place of a close textual reading is presumptuous 
to the extreme. This would seem to be especially true in regard to the 
Hebrew Bible, given its majestic place in western civilization. "In the 
end," as H. S. Nyberg put it, "we should remember a good old philologi 
cal rule: when one does not understand something, one should first mis 
trust oneself and not the text."7 
Notes 
1. The Epic of Gilgamesh, translated by N. K. Sandars (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1972), p. 65. 
2. See A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament by F. Brown, S. 
R. Divers, and C. Briggs, pp. 16, 326. 
3. Pp. 54, 73, 294. 
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4. See pp. 291f. where Bloom readily concedes this for J's Yahweh, who 
". . . stands beyond sexuality." 
5. Hebrew Union College Annual LXIV (1973), pp. 1-55. 
6. See Bloom's excellent observation about "oral tradition" on p. 274. 
Bloom himself, however, seems much of the time to be looking for that 
which is not there. 
7. Quoted in Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 385. 
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